What Can Constitutions Do?: The Afghan Case by Huq, Aziz & Ginsburg, Tom
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2014
What Can Constitutions Do?: The Afghan Case
Aziz Huq
Tom Ginsburg
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, "What Can Constitutions Do?: The Afghan Case," 24 Journal of Democracy 116 (2014).
WhaT Can ConSTiTuTionS Do? 
The afghan CaSe
Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq
Tom Ginsburg is Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, Ludwig 
and Hilde Wolf Research Scholar, and professor of political science 
at the University of Chicago. Aziz Huq is assistant professor of law 
and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar at the University 
of Chicago.
On 26 January 2014, Afghanistan’s constitution will reach its tenth 
anniversary. This milestone is unlikely to be marked by celebrations. 
Afghans will have other things on their minds, as 2014 is likely to be a 
make-or-break year for the regime installed by the international commu-
nity after the defeat of the Taliban. Not only are all NATO combat troops 
due to be withdrawn this year, but on April 5 Afghans are scheduled to 
elect a successor to Hamid Karzai, who has served as the country’s only 
president under the current constitution but is prohibited by its provisions 
from seeking a third term. If the disputed 2009 presidential and 2010 par-
liamentary elections are any guide, the 2014 polls could well suffer from 
fraud and violent vote suppression. In any case, with the Taliban having 
chosen to boycott, the polls are unlikely to help stabilize the military 
conflict. Political gridlock rather than a new democratic mandate may 
instead be the end result. At the same time, the looming U.S. and NATO 
military withdrawals—sure to be followed by a Taliban offensive—make 
the state’s prospects for survival even more uncertain. Even now, the 
national government’s writ does not extend far beyond Kabul, with in-
surgents destabilizing provinces such as Ghazni, Logar, and Wardak, and 
the Afghan National Army is far from self-sufficient.1 To many eyes, 
Afghanistan is a case study in state failure waiting to be written.
 Does this mean that the 2004 Constitution, which forms the basis 
of the Afghan state, should be condemned as a failure? Not necessar-
ily. For one thing, the Afghan Constitution has already outlived many 
of its counterparts. Of the 964 constitutions promulgated during the 
last two centuries, only 406 remained in force for more than a decade.2 
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Moreover, Afghanistan has experienced some elements of democratic 
governance during the last ten years. In addition to holding two previ-
ous presidential elections in 2004 and 2009, Afghans have voted for 
representatives to the lower house (Wolesi Jirga or House of the People) 
of the National Assembly in 2005 and 2010, albeit under increasingly 
fraught conditions. Both legislative elections resulted in some turnover 
and featured genuine campaigns in many parts of the country. In 2010, 
more than half the 194 representatives lost their seats. Parliament is no 
rubber stamp—it has rejected some of President Hamid Karzai’s cabinet 
nominees, overridden his vetoes, and even compelled him to change the 
composition of the Supreme Court. 
In the quarter-century before Afghanistan adopted the 2004 Consti-
tution, more than two-hundred new national charters came into force 
across the globe.3 Given the ongoing turbulence in many parts of the 
world, the present “era of constitution-making” shows no sign of abat-
ing. Despite all the aspirational homilies about how new constitutions 
can bring about the rule of law, human rights, and democracy, however, 
there is a surprising dearth of tools with which to judge the success or 
failure of such documents. We need a set of tractable metrics to gauge a 
new constitution’s success at attaining certain goals. Such concepts and 
measures would aid in the design of new constitutions and inform deci-
sions about when to abandon those that are ineffective. 
The tenth anniversary of the Afghan Constitution provides a good op-
portunity to think more broadly about the appropriate midrange metrics 
and to identify reasonable expectations for constitutions. It is too easy 
to lay blame or bestow praise on a country’s basic law for outcomes that 
it did not generate. Today’s constitutional designer should keep in mind 
James Madison’s famous caution that constitutional texts are only frag-
ile “parchment barriers” against internal political resistance and external 
economic or strategic shocks.4 Absent some measure of what constitu-
tions cannot do, any account of what constitutions can or should do is 
dangerously incomplete. Our aim here is to start drawing that line.
The 2004 Constitution was a byproduct of an extraordinary inter-
national effort, motivated primarily by U.S. security concerns, to end 
Afghanistan’s decades-long civil war. In December 2001, the United 
Nations convened non-Taliban Afghan factions in Bonn, Germany, to 
develop a roadmap for the reconstruction of a national government and 
to select a new leader—Hamid Karzai—to replace the ousted Taliban.5 
The resulting “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan 
Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions” 
(known as the Bonn Agreement) envisaged a constitutional commission 
tasked with producing a new draft constitution within two years. This 
draft was to go before a loya jirga, or grand assembly, for approval. 
From the beginning, then, constitutional reconstruction was a central 
part of post-2001 international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.
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President Karzai appointed a constitutional commission in late 2002, 
but it soon fell victim to internal tensions and its lack of organizational 
capacity. He appointed a second commission in April 2003. This body 
crafted a document that tilted heavily toward parliamentary power. Be-
fore releasing it to the public in November 2003, however, Karzai and 
his staff modified the draft to amplify presidential powers and eliminate 
the constitutional court.
Just one month later, giving the public little time for deliberation or 
input, Karzai convened a constitutional loya jirga. The assembly of 502 
delegates from around the country comprised a wide range of actors, 
including regional warlords, women, representatives of refugee com-
munities, and Karzai appointees. On 4 January 2004, after three weeks 
of intense deliberation, the loya jirga approved the constitution without 
making any changes. 
The document establishes a presidential system with a bicameral 
legislature and an independent supreme court. The government is not 
federal but unitary, with provincial governors appointed by the central 
government. Although this vision of a centralized Afghan state hardly 
reflected the reality on the ground, the document’s framers seemed to 
believe that formally decentralizing power would further undermine the 
already weak center. Despite giving a central role to Islam, the consti-
tution does provide some room for minority rights—for example, by 
recognizing a number of official languages and by allowing the applica-
tion of Shia jurisprudence to members of that community. In addition, 
both the lower and upper houses have reserved seats for women. The 
constitution also includes an array of human-rights commitments and 
establishes an Independent Human Rights Commission.
The expectations for the new constitution were inextricably bound 
up with hopes for the new Karzai regime. Even as war with the Tali-
ban raged and former warlords wielded near-absolute power across the 
country, many Afghans were cautiously optimistic about a future under 
the new administration. The constitution, by providing a legitimate ba-
sis for governance and the promise of popular participation, fueled that 
optimism. 
Constitutional Longevity
Between 1919, when Afghanistan won independence from British 
tutelage, and 1996, when the Taliban came to power, a series of con-
stitutions were promulgated by the country’s various leaders or ruling 
bodies. The fate of each document was entwined with that of its author. 
Afghanistan’s first basic law, put forward by the modernizing autocrat 
Emir Amanullah (1919–29) and passed in 1923, sparked tribal revolts 
that ultimately toppled both Amanullah and the constitution. Its highly 
conservative 1931 successor, promulgated under a subsequent monarch, 
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Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929–33), was essentially ignored after his as-
sassination in 1933. The next constitution, adopted in 1964 late in the 
reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933–73), established a constitutional 
monarchy, granted numerous individual rights, and significantly broad-
ened political space. At the same time, it produced paralyzing political 
gridlock and mounting frustration within ruling elites. 
In 1973, the king’s cousin and former prime minister, Daoud Khan, 
led a military coup that ousted the long-ruling monarchy and became 
president of a new republic. Daoud enacted a constitution in 1976, but 
that document proved evanescent. Two years later, the Daoud regime fell 
in a coup staged by a leftist faction from within the Afghan military. The 
new communist regime adopted a temporary constitution in 1980 that, 
like the regime itself, was extremely unpopular. Consequently, the new 
constitution was largely irrelevant beyond certain urban centers. In 1987, 
shortly after Mohammad Najibullah (1987–92) became president, a loya 
jirga passed yet another constitution. The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and 
subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, prevented the pres-
ident from securing popular support for an amended, again reformist, ba-
sic law in 1990. His government was finally forced out of power in 1992 
by mujahideen factions as the country fell into civil war, and Najibullah 
himself was murdered in 1996.
Every state is partly shaped by external forces, but, as this brief his-
tory intimates, these have always played an outsized role in Afghani-
stan. Since Amanullah’s reign, governing elites have relied on outside 
resources in lieu of developing a legitimate state. The successes and 
failures of the 2004 document must therefore be understood in light of 
exogenous economic, geopolitical, and strategic dynamics. Foreign as-
sistance can be both a blessing and curse for constitutional survival. 
International funding and humanitarian aid facilitated reconstruction of 
an Afghan state apparatus shredded by civil war and the Taliban. Tech-
nical aid to parliament, the courts, and the administration—if often a 
bone of contention between Karzai and his foreign backers—has given 
the country at least some of the institutional tools needed to implement 
the constitution. At the same time, however, foreign assistance has been 
a source of corruption, enabling the national government to channel its 
authority through both crooked bureaucrats in Kabul and thuggish war-
lords on the periphery. Opposition to the resulting high rates of govern-
mental corruption and violence has been a principal driver of recruit-
ment for the neo-Taliban insurgency.6 
The international narcotics market has also been a major factor. 
In 2012, Afghanistan supplied 75 percent of the global market for 
heroin, with that number expected to rise to 90 percent in 2013.7 The 
poppy economy generates steady tax revenue for the Taliban, and the 
insurgency exploits local disputes over the internationally driven crop-
eradication efforts in order to draw local notables into its camp. At 
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the same time, the lure of opium dollars undermines the integrity and 
efficacy of local police and courts.8 
In short, just as the constitution was the product of global forces in 
2004, it now risks falling victim to global political and economic ten-
sions in 2014. The complexity of Afghanistan’s relationship with geo-
politics and the global economy serves as a reminder that constitutions 
do not exist outside the stream of world history. They may be one cause 
of state success or failure, but they are hardly the whole story. 
As a result, national-level economic statistics, such as GDP or the 
balance of payments, are by themselves inadequate measures for assess-
ing a constitution’s success. The same is true of a country’s geopolitical 
successes and failures. All these are the result not only of constitutional 
rules, but also of many other factors. On their own, they are not reliable 
proxies for judging a nation’s basic law. 
Alternatively, we could use a constitution’s longevity as a measure 
of its success. Yet a basic law is not adopted for its own sake. It is an 
instrument for achieving greater social goods. When it ceases serving 
that end, we should scrap it. In any case, no constitution lasts forever; 
across the globe, the average life expectancy of those promulgated since 
1789 is a mere nineteen years.9 On the other hand, a constitution that 
dies after only a year or two must be deemed a failure by any metric. 
Furthermore, Afghanistan’s history suggests that cycling through one 
short-lived constitution after another also bodes ill for social and eco-
nomic goals. Without the decade of relative stability that Afghanistan 
has enjoyed under the 2004 Constitution, even the country’s incremental 
gains—for example, in women’s access to employment and education—
would have been elusive.10 
What Constitutions Can Do
Even though constitutions are inextricably embedded in their dis-
tinctive economic and geopolitical contexts and some basic design 
questions have an implacably normative cast, the drafters of new con-
stitutions still need some realistically attainable goals. These goals 
would help to guide the complex task of institutional design so that it 
takes into account the expected interactions between the new institu-
tions created under a constitution and the economic, social, and politi-
cal contexts in which those institutions will operate. But what should 
those goals be? 
We propose four midrange goals whose achievement arguably can be 
attributed to the constitution itself rather than exogenous circumstances. 
Constitutions can be assessed by the extent to which they: 1) generate 
legitimacy for the state; 2) channel political conflict through formal in-
stitutions rather than violence; 3) limit the agency costs of government; 
and 4) facilitate the production of public goods.
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Legitimating the new state. Our first metric focuses on the necessary 
political foundation for a desirable and sustainable state. For a nonau-
thoritarian state to persist, it must possess some measure of legitimacy 
among the general public. This is so even for authoritarian states, which 
also benefit from legitimation measures. In the short term, substantial 
popular disaffection and antipathy toward the state will impede govern-
ment initiatives, and may ultimately prove fatal. For, as Max Weber 
observed, few states can survive by relying exclusively on violence to 
secure compliance. It is simply too costly. Constitutions—as reflections 
of shared values and facilitators of participatory politics—are a potent 
source of legitimacy that can obviate the need for coercion. 
How does Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution rank in terms of public 
legitimacy? Afghans can point to several successful exercises in demo-
cratic governance. First, despite the machinations of Karzai and his for-
eign backers, the 2004 constitutional loya jirga is widely viewed as hav-
ing been a success. As noted above, the 2005 and 2010 parliamentary 
elections were vigorously contested (although voter turnout fell from 
51.7 percent in 2005 to 29.7 percent in 2010). Both elections produced 
parliaments that demonstrated independence from the presidency. Par-
liamentary vigor has been achieved despite Afghanistan’s single non-
transferable vote (SNTV) system, which impedes the development of 
strong political parties. Of the 2,800 candidates who sought legislative 
office in 2005, only 16 percent were members of a party, a proportion 
that fell to 10 percent in 2010. Nonetheless, a pro-Karzai faction and a 
loose opposition group have emerged in parliament. 
Despite intense political infighting, the president and parliament man-
aged in July 2013 to agree upon a revised electoral framework for the 
2014 polls. Since the enactment of the two electoral statutes, however, 
Karzai has been accused of stacking one of the two election-oversight 
commissions, the Independent Election Complaints Commission, with his 
political allies. Given the continuing tensions over electoral administra-
tion, the 2014 election will be a critical test of the constitution’s efficacy. 
One key constitutional provision is the clear two-term limit on the presi-
dency. Popular respect for the constitutional system remains sufficiently 
great that mass demonstrations would be likely to erupt if Karzai, notwith-
standing his commitment to step down, attempted to stay in power after 
his second term ends this year.11 
Recent polling identifies sustained public support for national institu-
tions despite persistent economic hardship. On the one hand, an August 
2012 Gallup poll found 71 percent of Afghans to be “struggling,” with 
more than one in three reporting recent stress and fewer than one in three 
expressing satisfaction with their standard of living.12 On the other hand, 
a 2012 Asia Foundation survey found that 73 percent of Afghans consid-
ered the central government to be doing a “very good or somewhat good 
job.” A remarkable 72 percent of respondents said that parliament was 
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addressing ordinary citizens’ problems. At the same time, 32 percent 
complained of corruption and 23 percent of insecurity, suggesting that 
the state has yet to find firm footing.13 
The protection of minority rights also bolsters legitimacy. Afghani-
stan’s constitution includes a nondiscrimination clause and, for the first 
time in the country’s history, protects the rights of the Shia minority to 
have Shia law applied in the courts. The predominantly Shia Hazara mi-
nority is more integrated into the national government than ever before, 
a success personified by Vice-President Karim Khalili. 
Yet even Afghanistan’s limited achievements need to be viewed in 
proper perspective. In circumstances of great hardship and insecurity, 
Afghans have begun to forge a participatory democracy and a sense of 
ownership of their national government. There is some reason to believe 
that gross constitutional violations of the political rules would trigger 
significant public resistance. On our first metric, that of legitimacy, 
then, the constitution performs surprisingly well. 
Channeling political conflict through formal institutions. A demo-
cratic constitution aims to create governance institutions that channel 
conflict among powerful stakeholders. These political substitutes for 
violence diminish the risk of corrosive internal strife. While no con-
stitution can completely eliminate political conflict, a well-designed 
constitution can change the terms on which political battles are fought 
and thereby lower the collateral costs of conflict. Key to containing and 
managing political conflict are mechanisms that lower the stakes of 
electoral defeat. If a constitution permits some stakeholders to dominate 
others after assuming office, those out of power lose any incentive to 
stay within the bounds of constitutional competition. Likewise, if the 
costs of losing office are too high, incumbents will respond by refusing 
to step down or otherwise seeking to entrench their political power.14 
Creating effective political arenas that can operate as alternatives to 
open conflict is not easy. Moreover, poorly designed parliamentary bodies 
or electoral rules can deepen ethnic or racial divides, and possibly even 
revive latent conflicts. Poorly drafted, ambiguous, or merely incomplete 
constitutional texts may perversely generate new sources of conflict. 
In its early years, the 2004 Constitution provided a useful framework 
for constraining conflict between the country’s ethnopolitical factions. 
Cooptation through offers of cabinet positions or gubernatorial appoint-
ments replaced the outright violence experienced during the civil war in 
the 1990s. The Karzai regime brought into the ruling coalition and the 
cabinet controversial figures from the northern Tajik and Uzbek com-
munities. So far, this strategy for keeping the peace has prevailed, but 
at a cost: It has meant forgoing any discussion of accountability for the 
human-rights violations that took place during the civil war and has re-
sulted in increased rent-seeking by corrupt government officials. 
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The separation of presidential and parliamentary powers established 
by the constitution also provides an avenue for working out potentially 
explosive disputes. In May 2006, for example, parliamentary action led 
to changes to the Supreme Court, including the ouster of the chief jus-
tice. In 2007, the Wolesi Jirga voted to 
remove Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar 
Spanta. But Karzai disputed the legal-
ity of Spanta’s ouster, and the Supreme 
Court upheld Karzai’s position. At the 
beginning of Karzai’s second term in 
January 2010, the Wolesi Jirga rejected 
17 of his 24 cabinet nominations. In Au-
gust 2012, the legislature voted to oust 
Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak 
and Interior Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammedi. Both were removed, 
though later reappointed to different cabinet positions. This checkered 
record suggests that at the very least, there are some interbranch checks 
and balances at play.
At the same time, the constitution has also created new flash points for 
internal conflict. Of these, the most significant is the electoral system, 
about which the constitutional text is largely silent. Article 83 envisages 
an electoral system adopted through “election laws.” Yet initially no 
such statute was passed. Instead, in response to a UN proposal to use a 
provincially based proportional-representation system, Karzai issued a 
2004 decree directing the use of the SNTV system. This relatively com-
plex system confused voters, inhibited political-party development, and 
produced not only wide swings in electoral outcomes but also allowed 
candidates to win by very small margins. The use of the SNTV in the 
2010 legislative elections, coupled with widespread fraud and violent 
voter suppression, precipitated a lengthy political crisis. Dozens of seats 
were disputed because of small margins and large uncertainties concern-
ing fraud and the accuracy of poll results. In the southeastern province 
of Ghazni, for example, where there is a volatile mix of Hazaras and 
Pashtuns, the fact that no Pashtun candidate seemed to prevail at the 
polls sparked a wave of street demonstrations. 
In the wake of such protests and given the poor electoral showing of 
his legislative allies, Karzai ordered the Supreme Court to set up a spe-
cial tribunal to review complaints about the 2010 election. The consti-
tutionally mandated Independent Election Commission (IEC), however, 
immediately challenged the establishment of this new tribunal, with the 
parliament then leaping in to impeach the six Supreme Court justices 
who voted in favor of the new body. Karzai, in turn, sought to prevent 
the new parliament from being seated. By August 2011, a tentative deal 
had been reached, but not before the tensions between the Karzai presi-
dency and the parliament had been further exacerbated by divisive, eth-
Poorly drafted, 
ambiguous, or 
merely incomplete con-
stitutional texts may 
perversely generate new 
sources of conflict.
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nically tinged rhetoric. It was not until mid-2013, after months of fierce 
political conflict, that new electoral laws were finally passed. It remains 
to be seen whether the new framework for the 2014 elections, which 
retains SNTV and lowers the number 
of seats reserved for women, will fare 
any better than earlier iterations.15
The 2010 elections debacle oc-
cured in part because the constitution 
is ambiguous about the president’s 
power to issue decrees and about the 
judiciary’s role in resolving election-
related disputes. Article 64 of the 
constitution, which enumerates presi-
dential “authorities and duties,” does 
not expressly include decree author-
ity, much less any power to create a 
special tribunal to resolve election 
disputes. That omission from an otherwise comprehensive list (one 
that includes such trivialities as the bestowal of medals, insignias, 
and honorary titles) might be read to imply that no presidential decree 
power exists. At the same time, other articles of the constitution, such 
as those permitting emergency executive rule, seem to assume some 
sort of executive decree power. Karzai has exploited this ambiguity in 
destabilizing and arguably illegal ways to exercise powers that seem-
ingly belong to parliament. Furthermore, as his creation of a special 
electoral tribunal that undermined the authority of the IEC demon-
strates, presidential influence over the judiciary allows the president 
to use the courts as a means to circumvent other, more independent 
constitutional bodies. 
Such conflicts over institutional power are, to be sure, hardly unusual 
in new democracies. Nor is there anything uniquely Afghan about am-
biguous constitutional wording being compounded by self-serving inter-
pretations on the part of courts or elected officials. What is unusual—
and what has exacerbated the conflicts that do arise—is the absence of 
a clear mechanism in the 2004 Constitution for resolving constitutional 
disputes. This lacuna flows from textual changes made at the last minute 
of the drafting process. 
Due to eleventh-hour interventions, a Constitutional Court initially 
established in draft Article 146 was eliminated, while only some of its 
powers were given to the Supreme Court. Article 121 of the adopted 
constitution states that the government or courts can request the Su-
preme Court to review laws and treaties for compatibility with the con-
stitution. It does not, however, explicitly give the Court a general power 
to “interpret” the constitution outside of this limited context. In addi-
tion, Article 157 establishes an Independent Commission for Supervi-
Although much of the 
political conflict among 
Afghan elites was ini-
tially channeled through 
political institutions, ba-
sic questions about those 
institutions and their 
interactions have begun 
to paralyze government. 
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sion of the Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC), whose mem-
bers are nominated by the president and approved by parliament. The 
ICSIC’s powers are poorly specified. Although probably intended as a 
body to monitor and facilitate the development of legislation and admin-
istrative procedures required to implement the constitution, in practice 
it has served as an alternative and competing locus of constitutional 
interpretation. The net result is that the text of the constitution has been 
read to contain two competing, rather than one univocal, mechanisms 
for resolving the many disputes that arise concerning the institutional 
allocation of powers under the constitution. 
The consequences of this inherent conflict did not materialize im-
mediately. From 2004 to 2007, the Supreme Court instead acted as if 
it had a general power of constitutional interpretation. After the Su-
preme Court overturned the no-confidence vote on Foreign Minister 
Spanta, however, parliament voted to give the ICSIC power to “inter-
pret . . . the Constitution” at the request of the president, the parlia-
ment, the government, or the Supreme Court, as well as the power 
to review already-enacted laws for conformity with the constitution. 
Parliament passed this law over Karzai’s veto. In 2008, however, the 
Supreme Court, at the request of the president, exercised its authority 
(established in Article 123) to “review laws” for “compliance with 
the constitution,” and deemed the new powers granted to the ICSIC to 
be unconstitutional usurpations of the Supreme Court’s authority. Not 
surprisingly, the ICSIC contested the Court’s conclusion, citing the 
lack of any explicit assignment of general interpretive power to the Su-
preme Court in the text of the constitution. It was likely inevitable that 
such a manifestly divided and divisive institutional architecture would 
engender unnecessary conflicts over constitutional interpretation. The 
textual confusion also exacerbates political controversies over such 
issues as ministerial appointments, the special election tribunal, and 
impeachment.
Nevertheless, we see a logical way to resolve this perplexing and unde-
sirable situation. This would involve passing a constitutional amendment 
that clearly delineates the role of each body. Somewhat ironically, the ab-
sence of any clear allocation of interpretive authority is again a barrier to 
needed reform. The constitutional-amendment process, specified in Chap-
ter 6, requires the convening of a constitutional loya jirga, whose member-
ship includes both houses of parliament and the chairmen of the provincial 
and district councils. This body can meet with a quorum of 50 percent of 
its members. Due to security concerns, however, it has been impossible to 
hold district-level elections, with the result that only 385 of the 789 autho-
rized members are in office at the moment. One potential response to this 
dilemma would be to interpret Chapter 6 as requiring a quorum of 50 per-
cent of the number of officers actually elected. Thus, a quorum would be 
193 of 385, not 395 of 789. The ICSIC, however, has directed otherwise, 
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making any amendment of the constitution impossible until district elec-
tions are held. This will, in effect, bar any amendment until the war is over. 
Paradoxically, the various unresolved constitutional crises in Afghanistan 
(many of which could be dealt with through clarifying amendments) are 
hampering the possibility of stabilizing the country, which is necessary for 
holding district-level elections. And these in turn are necessary (according 
to the ICSIC) for passing constitutional amendments. 
In short, although much of the political conflict among Afghan elites 
was initially channeled through political institutions, basic questions 
about those institutions and their interactions have begun to paralyze gov-
ernment. The vagueness of the constitutional text, self-serving interpreta-
tions of the constitution by the Supreme Court and the ICSIC, and uncom-
promising attitudes toward conflict are preventing the effective operation 
of constitutional mechanisms. As a result, numerous pieces of critical leg-
islation have been significantly delayed, and intragovernmental conflict 
is high, even if it has not resulted in internal violence. The performance 
of the constitution on this metric is mixed, though hardly a total failure.
Limiting the “agency costs” of representative government. As James 
Madison and others have observed, the empowerment of political institu-
tions and officials creates the need to prevent them from engaging in self-
dealing. Agency costs come in many forms. One major risk is political 
entrenchment. Because some leaders wish to keep prolonging their stay 
in power and are willing to expend significant resources in order to do so, 
many democratic constitutions specify term limits for officeholders. The 
other key risk is fiscal corruption. Political figures may use government 
office for their personal gain rather than the public good.
The Afghan Constitution has done well in terms of limiting politi-
cal entrenchment, but faltered badly with regard to fiscal corruption. 
Madison envisaged a government whose power was limited through the 
careful structural design of legislative-executive relations. As we have 
suggested, the recent history of conflict between Karzai and parliament 
suggests some success on this front, given that the president’s power has 
been periodically checked. But there may also be stability-related costs 
from this interbranch tension, and it is unclear whether the collateral 
damage to the national political equilibrium outweighs the benefit from 
diminished agency costs. 
At a more granular level, the rate of parliamentary turnover has been 
impressive, and cabinet members have also changed over the years as 
Karzai has juggled various factions. Furthermore, Karzai’s promise to 
step down later this year, if indeed implemented peacefully, will be a 
significant benchmark. The president has formed no political party, 
so barring his appointment of a family member, his resignation would 
represent a genuine transfer of power. Many new democratic constitu-
tions fail at such moments, yet we are cautiously optimistic that the long 
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lead-up to the 2014 polls could allow diverse political forces to position 
themselves for a peaceful transition.
Efforts to stem corruption, by contrast, have failed miserably. Af-
ghanistan remains an exceedingly poor country, so some corruption is to 
be expected. Yet it consistently ranks at or near the bottom of Transpar-
ency International’s global Corruption Perceptions Index. The govern-
ment shows little concern about the problem. On the contrary, senior 
officials have repeatedly interfered in efforts to investigate the Kabul 
Bank scandal, which led to a run on that bank in 2010. Not only did 
Karzai himself select the members of the investigative committee but 
his attorney general took more than a year to begin inquiries into the 
case, and the resulting prosecutions and penalties have been decried as 
too weak to be effective. That same year, Karzai shut down the prosecu-
tion of one of his closest aides by firing the deputy attorney general who 
was leading anticorruption efforts. 
The widespread looting of state assets to benefit the politically con-
nected has cast perhaps the single greatest shadow on governmental 
legitimacy. Similarly, one intensive study of five provinces concluded 
that the “main reported drivers of conflict or insecurity were poor gov-
ernance, corruption, and predatory officials.”16 Concern about the poor 
progress of the internal investigations prompted the international com-
munity to push for a new institution, the Independent Joint Anti-Corrup-
tion Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. This body, which consists 
of three international members and three Afghans, is charged with mon-
itoring and evaluating anticorruption efforts. Its contentious relations 
with the attorney general’s office and the High Office of Oversight and 
Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), the governmental body tasked with anticor-
ruption efforts, have hampered the committee’s activities, though. 
Although the HOOAC, unlike many analogous bodies around the 
world, lacks constitutional stature, we do not believe that constitutional-
izing it would have made a difference. Nevertheless, rampant corrup-
tion and related political interference with prosecutions seem to have 
increased during Karzai’s second term, suggesting that presidential 
term limits have induced a rush to pocket as much as possible before a 
transfer of power. Paradoxically, the constitution’s success in limiting 
political entrenchment may be exacerbating the country’s corrosion by 
corruption. We find one lonely bright spot—a growing trend toward 
parliamentary investigations into corruption. In August 2012, for ex-
ample, the Wolesi Jirga launched an investigation into the activities of 
the minister of finance, the acting minister of defense, and the chief of 
the HOOAC. It seems unlikely, though, that these investigations will be 
able to stem the destabilizing tide of graft.
Creating national public goods. Ultimately, a constitution prevails if 
it puts the country’s people in a better material position. In this regard, a 
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central function of any scheme of government is to produce what econo-
mists call “public goods”—a free market, national defense, and a regula-
tory environment in which development can flourish. These nonrivalrous, 
nonexcludable goods would typically be underproduced if left to private 
hands. Judgments about this metric, to be sure, are contingent on a state’s 
starting point: The level of welfare gains that the divided and troubled 
Afghan government can be expected to deliver are far below what was ex-
pected, for example, of the government of a newly reunified Germany. A 
useful gauge of a new government’s ability to foster national public goods, 
therefore, must be sensitive to local contingencies and opportunities.
Afghanistan has actually experienced some startling if underreported 
successes in the past decade: Life expectancy has increased by twenty 
years since 2002, to age 62; school enrollments are up eightfold; GDP 
is up fourfold; and government revenue collection from taxes and cus-
toms has risen on average 20 percent a year since 2002. To what degree 
can such aggregate measures of social welfare be attributed to any con-
stitutional scheme? Perhaps the best that can be said of the constitu-
tion is that by providing a legitimate government capable of interacting 
with international donors, it has facilitated the transfer of hundreds of 
billions of dollars in development assistance, and that this in turn has 
yielded some social and economic gains.
Whether those gains will be sustained, however, is unclear. Afghan-
istan’s official economy is overshadowed by its illegal counterpart—
most notably, the opiates trade, but also trafficking in women and a 
transit-trade in goods purchased duty-free in the Gulf and smuggled into 
India and Pakistan. As for legal businesses, Afghanistan ranks 168th out 
of 185 nations on the World Bank’s scale for ease of doing business. 
Efforts to benefit from large stocks of copper, coal, lithium, natural gas, 
and precious stones have proceeded ponderously, hindered by corrup-
tion and an absence of infrastructure. The Afghan Constitution has not 
fostered the transparent, honest administrative capacity necessary to es-
tablish a durable basis for continuing the production of public goods. 
Another important public good is human security, and here the re-
cord remains decidedly mixed. A December 2012 U.S. Department of 
Defense report on the Afghan national security forces noted a growing 
capacity in both the army and police despite high attrition rates: As of 
30 September 2012, the report found that 182,209 soldiers and 147,158 
police were in training or in the field, and they helped to reduce insur-
gent violence from its 2010 peak.17 The report cautioned, however, that 
only one of the Afghan National Army’s 23 brigades was able to oper-
ate without military support from the international coalition. Whether 
Karzai’s army will prove more robust than Najibullah’s did thus remains 
an open question, particularly given the persistent military strength of 
regional powerbrokers such as Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan.
Progress on the rule of law has also been mixed. Roughly 35 percent 
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of the Afghan police are either untrained or unvetted. Moreover, cor-
ruption and the poor quality of training are believed to be undermin-
ing security in ways that help the insurgency. A 2011 UN survey, for 
example, found that 18 percent of Afghans knew which police officers 
would be likely to accept bribes.18 That survey and other recent poll-
ing, however, also report high levels of public support for the police.19 
If the police force is a major problem, the legal system is no less so. 
The Defense Department reported that suspects often are released 72 
hours after arrest because of the courts’ failure to follow legally re-
quired procedures. The Afghan courts’ “catastrophic state of disre-
pair”20 means that public security remains a distant goal. In short, the 
constitutional order has generated only a partial state monopoly on 
violence. 
No one expected Kabul to resemble Stockholm or Oslo a decade af-
ter adopting a new constitution. Yet even when measured against more 
realistic expectations, the constitution has not been terribly successful 
in terms of fostering those national public goods that were within reach. 
Had a better scheme of governance emerged, with less corruption being 
tolerated each year and more attention being given each year to the mate-
rial welfare of the country, the public would surely be better off than it is 
now. At the same time, the constitution did facilitate sufficient stability 
to induce foreigners to fund a partial reconstruction of the Afghan state.
 So will the Afghan Constitution endure? We have emphasized that 
mere survival is not a metric for judging success. Nonetheless, future 
failure of the Afghan state might fairly be laid at the door of its consti-
tution’s drafters. Based on our four midrange goals, the 2004 Constitu-
tion presents a genuinely mixed picture. Although it performed well 
in terms of legitimacy and decently in terms of channeling political 
conflict, it also needlessly fostered new sources of internal discord and 
failed to produce the crucial public good of human security. The key 
success of the constitution, in retrospect, was the creation of a govern-
ment just legitimate enough to extract resources from the rest of the 
world. Whether or not this proves sufficient to prevent a renewed slide 
into civil war, it does suggest that constitution drafters of the future 
have both positive and negative lessons to learn from Afghanistan’s 
recent experiences. 
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